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COMMENTARY
Judicial Review and the Problems of Southern
Africa*
Honorable Michael M. Corbett**
On the 6th June 1966 an eminent American visitor addressed the
academic staff and the student body of the University of Cape
Town. The occasion was a Day of Affirmation organized by the students. The speaker commenced his address by saying:
I come here because of my deep interest and affection for a land
settled by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century, then taken
over by the British, and at last independent; a land in which the
native inhabitants were at first subdued, but relations with whom
remain a problem to this day; a land which defined itself on a
hostile frontier; a land which has tamed rich natural resources
through the energetic application of modern technology; a land
which once imported slaves, and now must struggle to wipe out
the last traces of that former bondage. I refer, of course, to the
United States of America.
The speaker was the late Senator Robert Kennedy. The opening
words of his address emphasize in dramatic fashion the historical
coincidences and the common experience which link your country
and mine. I have no doubt that this community of history and experience has contributed in no small measure to the interest and
concern shown in recent years by you and your countrymen regarding the present state and future welfare of South Africa. The
honour which I have been accorded in being invited to deliver this
lecture is, I surmise, further evidence of this interest and concern.
* Editor's note: This is the unedited text of the Henry C. Morris Distinguished Lecture
on International Law delivered by Judge Michael M. Corbett to the Chicago Bar Association
on October 1, 1980, including the footnotes of the author. Additional footnotes containing
further explanation and/or citation have been inserted by the editorial board. These
footnotes are designated by the notation (ed. note) and are set off by brackets, to indicate
that they are not those of the author.
** Judge, Appeal Court, Republic of South Africa, LL.B., Cape Town, 1946; LL.B.,
Trinity Hall, Cambridge, 1948.

Loyola University Law journal

[Vol. 12

The comparison implicit in Senator Kennedy's words has much
validity, but it also has its limitations, recognition of which is
essential to a proper understanding of my country. Historically,
South Africa and the United States of America have a great deal in
common, but in certain respects their paths have diverged. The
Cape, where the first Dutch settlers established themselves on the
southwestern tip of Africa in the mid-seventeenth century, remained essentially a Dutch settlement, despite an influx of French
Huguenots and the advent of numerous German-speakers, for
more than 150 years before being finally taken over by the British.
By 1815, when British suzerainty over the Cape was formally established, the frontiers of the settlement had been extended in a
wide arc, and to the east reached as far as the Fish River, some 500
miles from Cape Town. History also shows that the British tried to
make the Cape a British colony; that they introduced British settlers; that they sought to replace the Dutch language by English;
that they emancipated the slaves.
Unlike America, at the Cape colonial resentment of British rule
was largely confined to the Dutch community and their reaction
was not to rebel but to trek away into the untamed, sparsely-populated hinterland and form their own settlements, the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. But these republics did not remain independent for long. Gold was discovered and
at the end of the nineteenth century they were overrun by British
imperialism and eventually subjugated after a bloody and bitter
three-year struggle. In this crucible of conflict the Afrikaner nation
was born. Fortified by the bonds of church, language and culture,
Afrikaner nationalism has grown in strength during the present
century. Far-visioned endeavours to achieve a political reconciliation between Boer and Briton have largely failed. The most promising of these was ripped asunder when Hitler invaded Poland on 1
September 1939, and the South African Parliament three days
later resolved by a majority of 80 votes to 67 to declare war on
Nazi Germany. In 1948 Afrikaner nationalism triumphed, and the
National Party has remained in office, with increasing electoral
support, ever since. Afrikaner nationalism, for which there is no
American parallel, remains one of two dominant political forces in
South Africa today. The other is Black nationalism.
Another difference between our two countries is the obvious geographical fact that South Africa is situated on the African continent. Whereas Black Africans were imported into the United
States as slaves, in South Africa they were part, and numerically
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the most substantial part, of the indigenous population. The Cape
settlers and the migrant Bantu-speaking peoples of Southern Africa first met on the Fish River. During the course of the nineteenth
century, Black resistance to the trekkers and other white settlers
was broken and the Bantu tribes settled the territories left to
them. Until the Second World War the general pattern in South
Africa was much the same as that to be found in the rest of colonial Africa. All was, for the most part, quiescent. The continent
was often likened to a slumbering giant. But the war and its aftermath appeared to change this. The empires of the European imperial powers started to break up. The United Nations Organization
was formed and its general assembly proclaimed the principle of
self-determination for all peoples. A spirit of fierce nationalism
overtook the world.
Against this backdrop the African giant stirred from his
slumbers. Nationalist liberation movements in colonial territories
campaigned actively, and often violently, to throw off the colonial
yoke, to attain independence; and in the end they were all successful. The 1950's and the 1960's saw the emancipation of Africa. By
the end of the 1960's, indigenous Black governments had been installed in all the former colonial territories in Africa, save for
South Africa's immediate neighbours: viz., Southern Rhodesia, now
Zimbabwe; the administered territory of South West Africa, now
called Namibia; and the two Portuguese colonies of Angola and
Mozambique. But the status quo in these territories was not long
maintained. The Portuguese colonies were the first to go, abandoned to Black and so-called Marxist regimes. The recent history
of Zimbabwe is fresh in our recollections. Namibia is, hopefully, in
the process of a peaceful evolution to independence.' That leaves
the focus on South Africa.
Like the rest of Africa, South Africa has also experienced the
growth of nationalism among its indigenous Black peoples, and to
the outside observer it might be tempting to conclude that the pattern of development in the rest of Africa will, and should, be repeated to the south of the Limpopo. But it would be wrong, in my
view, to equate South Africa with the former colonial territories of
Africa. South Africa is not a colonial possession: it is, and has been
since 1961, a legally-constituted, independent republic, outside the
British Commonwealth. The whites of South Africa, particularly
[1. See generally Ferguson, Arnold, Baker, Cotter, Minikes, Africa: Last Steps in
Decolonization, 72 AM. Soc. INT. L. PRoc. 299 (1978). (ed. note))
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the Afrikaners, are not European expatriates: they are Africans,
whose successive forebears have, in many instances, lived in South
Africa for almost as long as there have been white people living in
North America. The situation cannot be resolved merely by cutting
the colonial umbilical cord and handing over [the country] to the
Blacks.
There is another factor as well. Like the USA, South Africa is a
country which, to use Senator Kennedy's words, "has tamed rich
natural resources through the energetic application of modern
technology." It has become the most developed industrial state in
Africa and, for its size, probably the wealthiest. It produces food in
abundance. It enjoys a very favourable trade balance. It exports
minerals (including some which are of great strategic value to the
West), coal, diamonds, agricultural products, food and manufactured goods to countries all over the world, including incidently
Black African countries. The United States is its largest trading
partner. It provides a communications network and efficiently-run
ports which serve a number of southern and central African countries. Many thousands from other African countries come to work
in South Africa.
In the last decade or so the Eastern-bloc countries, led by the
Soviet Union, have shown increasing interest in Africa. This has
taken the form, mainly, of intervention in conflict situations with a
view to securing Marxist regimes installed wherever possible.
Weaponry, advisers, training and political indoctrination have
been supplied on a liberal scale. In recent years Cuban surrogates
have been provided as well. The events of the past year or so
should have dispelled all doubts about Soviet expansionism. Many
South Africans believe that South Africa is regarded by Russia as
the richest prize on the African continent.
The manner in which successive South African governments
have sought to meet the challenges of these post-war years is, I
presume, well known to you, and I do not propose to dwell thereon.
All I wish to say is that there is a substantial and growing number
of white South Africans who believe that present Government policies do not provide the answer; that the mainstream of Black nationalism, much like Afrikaner nationalism before it, aims broadly
at achieving the fulfilment of Black aspirations for equality of
treatment and opportunity, for the recognition of the dignity of
man, and for due participation in the political processes whereby
the country is run; that the challenge of Black nationalism can
only be met by a comprehensive settlement negotiated with re-
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sponsible and acknowledged Black leaders; that in such a settlement process necessary parties would include the other minority
groups, viz., the Coloured peoples and the Asians; and that the
longer this process of negotiation is put off, the more likely it is
that attitudes will polarize, that the Black leaders will become
more militant, more extremist, and that the bargaining position of
the whites will worsen.
I am hopeful that in time this view will prevail. Already substantial changes have taken place. Constitution-making is in the air.
There is more fluidity in white attitudes than there has ever been
before. The lesson of Zimbabwe is recent and clear. At the same
time prejudice, possessiveness and fear hold the whites back.
Prejudice can be overcome, possessiveness can be subordinated to
the necessities of the situation, but how to allay the fears? For
these fears are very real. They are the fear that the whites, outnumbered by more than four to one, will be completely submerged
in a Black state; the fear that there may be discrimination against
whites because they are white; the fear that under the banner of a
more equitable distribution of wealth, whites will be deprived of
their property and that there will be a movement away from the
free enterprise system; the fear that there will be political instability, perhaps inter-tribal conflict or even a military coup d'etat, resulting in the establishment of a one-party state; the fear that the
economy of the country will be mismanaged, that South Africa's
great resources and rich potential will be dissipated, that corruption may become rife; the fear that standards may drop; the fear
that personal freedom, particularly freedom of speech and of the
press, curtailed as they are today, will disappear; the fear that authoritarianism will take over. And can anyone who has followed
the post-independence history of the emergent African states dismiss these fears as being groundless?
It must immediately be conceded that there is no ready answer
to all these problems, no ready method whereby these fears may be
allayed. If there were, it would have been found by now. It does,
however, lie within the power of the constitution-maker to devise a
political and social framework within which the danger of these
fears being realised may, at least, be substantially diminished. And
it is my belief that a most important instrument in the hands of
the constitution-maker is the concept of judicial review, coupled
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with a constitutionally-entrenched bill of rights.2 This brings me
back to the United States of America.
When, in 1803, the United States Supreme Court declared in
Marbury v. Madisons that the Constitution of the United States of
America was a "superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means," and held that a federal statute repugnant to the Constitution was invalid and should be disregarded, the Court established authoritatively that American courts enjoyed a power of
judicial review over legislation. Of course, the concept of such a
power of judicial review was not a wholly novel one. As Professor
Cappelletti has put it, ". . . the idea did not spring new and fully
developed from the head of John Marshall."'4 It was very much on
the minds of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia in 1787 and was widely debated by them, 5 although
they failed to spell it out clearly in the Constitution itself. Indeed,
as you all well know, the Bill of Rights, comprised in the first ten
amendments, was a later addition. Prior to 1803, American courts
had displayed what Professor Abraham has described as an "incipient concern with judicial review." 6 The concept of a superior or
natural law with which man-made laws should conform may be
traced back to classical times. Even in England, in the well-known
Bonham's Case, Chief Justice Coke had in 1610 asserted the power
of the courts to adjudge void an act of Parliament which was
"against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to
be performed." 7 Though it must be added that in that instance,
the English Parliament simply re-enacted the statute, and that was
about the last that was heard of judicial review over parliamentary
legislation in England.8
[2. See E.

CAHN, THE GREAT RIGHTS

(1963); R.

PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES

(1972);

Clark, Bicentennial Symposium: Constitutional Government-Strengths, Weaknesses, Future, 17 W. & M. L. REV. 417 (1976); Carlson, South Africa Today: The Security of the
State vs. the Liberty of the Individual, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (1972); Oakes, Proper Role of
the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 911 (1979); Ratner,
Constitutions, Majoritarianism,and Judicial Review: The Function of a Bill of Rights in
Israel and the United States, 26 Am. J. Coup. L. 373 (1978). But see Singh, What Cannot
Be Done Directly Cannot be Done Indirectly: A Study of the South African Constitution
in Retrospect, 1962 PUBLIC LAW 436 (1962). (ed. note)]
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 25 (1971) [hereinafter cited as CAPPELLE"rI].
5. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 304 (3d ed. 1975).
6. Id. at 308; see also CAPPELLET I, supra note 4, at 41.
7. Dr. Bonhams Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (1610).
[8. Littman, England Reconsiders "The Stated Case," 13 INT. LAW J. 253 (1979); R.
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But although judicial review was thus, in a sense, the product of
an evolutionary process of thought, the especial contribution of
Marbury v. Madison and the subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court entrenching and diversifying the system of judicial review in
America 9 is that they first established it as a working reality, and
rendered possible and effective the protection of rights granted by
a written constitution against not only executive and administrative acts, but also against parliamentary legislation. Since then, in
many instances inspired no doubt by the American example, about
60 countries throughout the world have adopted some form of judicial review.' 0 Professor Cappelletti has summed up the position
thus:
Our own time has seen the burgeoning of "constitutional justice",
which has in a sense combined the forms of legal justice and the
substance of natural justice. Desirous of protecting the permanent
will, rather than the temporary whims of the people, modern
states have re-asserted higher law principles through written constitutions. Thus there has been a synthesis of three separate concepts: the supremacy of certain higher principles, the need to put
even the higher law in written form, and the employment of the
judiciary as a tool for enforcing the constitution against ordinary
legislation. This union of concepts first occurred in the United
States, but it has since come to be considered by many as essential to the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) anywhere."
Perhaps one of the most interesting and instructive systems of
judicial review is that to be found today in West Germany. 2 Here
1800-1976 (1978).
(ed. note)]
[9. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923), overturned on other grounds, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
STEVENS, LAW AND POLiTics: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY,

157 U.S. 429 (1895); see generally Grant, Legal Effect of a Ruling that a Statute is Unconstitutional, 1978 DET. COLL. L. REV. 201 (1978). (ed. note)]
[10. See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 4; see also Cappelletti & Adams, Judicial Review of
Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1207 (1966); Dietze,
JudicialReview in Europe, 55 MICH. L. REV. 539 (1957); Cole, Three ConstitutionalCourts,
A Comparison, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 963 (1959); Deener, Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems, 46 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1079 (1952). (ed. note)]
11. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 4 at 42.
[12. See generally W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2831 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MURPHY & TANENHAUS]; H. Rupp, Judicial Review in the
Federal Republic of Germany, in WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS
742-54 (J. Merryman and D. Clark eds. 1978); F. Nova, Political Innovation of the West
German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on JudicialReview, 70 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 114-25 (1976); H. Rupp, Some Remarks on Judicial Self Restraint, 21 OHIO
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I should perhaps interpolate that I have no first-hand knowledge
of that country, but have relied mainly on Professor Kommers'
most interesting work, Judicial Politics in West Germany, pub1
lished in 1976.18 Unlike certain other countries, notably Australia '
and Japan,1 5 West Germany has not copied the United States
model. It has adopted what is termed the "centralized"' 6 type of
judicial control over the constitutionality of, inter alia, legislation.
In other words, in contrast to the American system, whereunder
the power of control is given to all judicial organs of the ordinary
legal systems, state and federal, in West Germany the power is
vested solely in a special Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which stands outside the German legal system. Although
the members of the Court must possess the qualifications for high
judicial office and some of the appointees are former federal
judges, the Court is regarded as a political rather than a legal
7
institution.'
The Court was created in 1951 in pursuance of the 1945 agreement at Potsdam, to the effect that the German judicial system
should be re-organized. 8' s Since then, the Court has undergone
structural modifications. Today it consists of sixteen justices, who
sit in two distinct panels, or "senates", as they are known, one presided over by the president of the Court and the other by the vicepresident. Half of the members of the Court are elected by the
STATE L.J. 503 (1960). See generally F. Friauf, Techniques for the Interpretationof Constitutions in German Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COM-

PARATIVE LAW (1968) [hereinafter cited as Friauf]. (ed. note)]
[13. D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLmCS IN WEST GERMANY: A Study of the Federal Constitutional Court (1976) [hereinafter cited as KOMMERS]. (ed. note)]
[14. See generally EDWARDS, JUDICIAL REVIEW (1969); Galligan, Judicial Review in the
Australian Federal System: Its Origin and Function, 10 F. L. REV. 367 (1979); Kadish,
Judicial Review in the United States Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia,37
TEx. L. REV. 1, 133 (1958). (ed. note)]
[15. See generally D. Danelski, The Political Impact of the Japanese Supreme Court,
49 NOTRE DAME L. 955 (1974); K. Ishimine, A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under
American and Japanese Constitutional Law (1974) (J.S.D. diss., Cornell University); George,
Japanese Judicial System: Thirty Years of Transition, 12 LOYOLA U. L. REv. (LA.) 807
(1979). (ed. note)]
16. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 4, at 46, 49-50.
[17. KOMMERS, supra note 13, at 129-31; but see Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 12,
at 30-31. See also D. Kommers, The Socialization and Recruitment of West German
Constitutional Court Judges, in FRONTIRS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (J. Grossman and J.
Tanenhaus ed. 1969); Bachof, West German Constitutional Judge Between Law and
Politics, 11 TEx. INT. L.J. 403 (1976). (ed. note)]
[18. See KOMMERS, supra note 13, at 70-82. (ed. note)]
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Bundestag,19 and half by the Bundesrat.20 All appointees-must be
at least 40 years of age and must possess the qualifications for judicial office stipulated by German law. Six of them, three in each
senate, must come from the ranks of sitting federal judges. They
are appointed for twelve-year, non-renewable periods of office and
must retire at the age of 68 years. They are not subject to impeachment by Parliament and can be removed from office only by
the President of the Federal Republic, acting pursuant to a motion
filed by the Court itself.
Essentially the function of the Court is to enforce the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz), the first twenty articles of which contain an elaborate bill of rights.2 1 Its jurisdiction is divided between the two senates. The first senate deals mainly with judicial review of legislation and with the substantive rights of persons, while the second
senate is concerned primarily with the procedural rights of persons
and with constitutional disputes between governmental agencies.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Court decides constitutional issues not in the ordinary
course of litigation, but as separate, self-contained questions submitted to the Court. The bulk of the Court's work is concerned
with "concrete judicial review" and "constitutional complaints."
"Concrete judicial review" arises out of an ordinary lawsuit proceeding in a state or federal court. If the court in question is convinced that a federal or state law under which the case has arisen
is unconstitutional, it must certify the constitutional question for
determination by the Constitutional Court before the case can be
decided. Where this is done, the Constitutional Court is obliged to
allow the federal or state organ involved to enter the case and be
heard. The Constitutional Court then decides the constitutional
[19. The Bundestag is the lower house of parliament in West Germany, elected through
a modified form of proportional representation. Art. 38, Basic Law of the Federal Republic
of West Germany. See MURPHY & TANENHAUS, supra note 12, at 23. The Bundestag elects
its one-half of the Court through a 12-man selection committee. Party representation on
this committee is directly proportionate to each party's relative strength in the Bundestag.
KOMMERS, supra note 13, at 89-90. (ed. note)]
[20. The Bundesrat is the upper house of the West German parliament, comprised of
Laender (states), cabinet officers and a limited number of representatives selected by the
individual states. MURPHY & TANENHAUS, supra note 12, at 24. The Bundesrat selects as a
whole its one-half of the Court, with a two-thirds majority required for selection. KoMMERS,
supra note 13, at 89-90. (ed. note)]
[21. For the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdiction, duties, and responsibilities relating to the Basic Law, see Article 93 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of West
Germany. See also Friauf, supra note 12, at 9-11; KOMMERS, supra note 13, at 100-08; MuRPHY & TANENHAUS, supra note 12, at 25, 29-30. (ed. note)]
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question and the court hearing the lawsuit is obliged to accept and
apply this decision. "Constitutional complaints," on the other
hand, comprise complaints lodged by individuals or corporate institutions who claim that their basic rights have been violated by
public authority. The process is quite informal. The majority of
complaints are handwritten and sent to the Court through the
post.
A full description of how the Constitutional Court handles its
workload would unduly protract this address, but a few details
might be of interest to American lawyers. The vast majority of
cases are disposed of without hearing legal argument by the representatives of the parties. In fact, according to Professor Kommers,
in the period from 1951 (when the Court commenced its work) to
July 1971, only 151 cases were decided after oral argument, which
is an average of about four cases annually per senate.22 The Court
is a busy one. During the period from September 1951 to December 1972 (a period of just over 21 years) 1379 cases of concrete
judicial review and 25,040 constitutional complaints were filed. 2' In
addition, there were some 473 cases of other categories.2 4 For various reasons, a number of these cases were terminated without a
decision, but the volume is nevertheless impressive. Decisions of
each senate are taken by a majority vote when unanimity cannot
be achieved. However, much importance is attached to the achievement of unanimity and considerable effort is expended to this end.
American lawyers will perhaps be surprised to hear that only in
1971 was the writing and publication of dissenting opinions
permitted.
As a practical institution the Court can be regarded as an enormous success. It is greatly respected. According to Professor Kommers, ". . . no other judicial tribunal in German history has
achieved the status or measure of independence that the Federal
Constitutional Court currently enjoys. '25 It is freely resorted to.
The size of its workload has already been referred to. (The
Germans are, of course, litigious people: even more so, it would
seem than the Americans-if that be possible! To illustrate this,
Professor Kommers points out that West Germany, with one-

22.

KOMME S, supra note 13, at 180.
[23. Id. at 163 (Table 8-Workload of Federal Constitutional Court from September 1,
1951 to December 31, 1972). (ed. note)]
[24. Id. (ed. note))
25. Id. at 86.
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fourth of the population of the USA, has in its state and federal
judicial systems over twice as many judges!) The Court has operated actively and fearlessly. Here is Professor Kommers'
assessment:
...the Constitutional Court has invalidated scores of statutory
provisions on equal protection grounds, cutting a fearless swath
through federal and state legislation that makes the U.S. Su26
preme Court look timid by comparison.
Considering the unhappy political history of Germany during the
thirty years or so prior to the establishment of the Court, this is a
remarkable achievement.
Well, so much for West Germany. Let us come back to Africa, to
South Africa in particular, and to the problems which will confront
those seeking a new political and constitutional dispensation in
that country. In this connection the critical questions which people
will ask are: what are the chances that a bill of rights, fortified by a
system of judicial review which would seek to render such rights
inviolate even at the hands of the legislature, would be acceptable
to the majority of South Africans? Can such a system be effective?
Will Parliament, when the conflict of wills comes, submit to the
supremacy of the courts?
Obstacles to the acceptability of judicial review there will undoubtedly be. Blacks may possibly feel that the system is antidemocratic, that it will place an unwarranted clog upon the popular will. They may ask, with some justification, why it is only when
they acquire a share of political power that the system is considered necessary. They may feel that, since in the beginning such a
court would necessarily be composed largely of white judges, it
would be unsympathetic to their point of view. But these obstacles
need not be insurmountable. In any event, judicial review would, I
visualize, be an integral part of a comprehensive package deal between the negotiating parties.
The effectiveness of a system of judicial review as a protector of
basic rights, in the South African scenario which I have postulated,
is a far more imponderable question. The history since independence of the Black states of Africa, unfortunately, does not provide
grounds for ready optimism. Most of the former British colonies in
Africa set off down the path of independence with constitutions
containing a justiciable bill of rights, modelled on the European
26.

Id. at 244.
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Convention on Human Rights.27 The first of these was Nigeria;"
the most recent was Zimbabwe.29 Tanzania rejected a bill of rights
in 1961 at the time of independence and again in 1965 when it
converted to a one-party state.30 In certain other states, e.g.,
Zambia and Sierra Leone, the entrenched bill of rights has, interestingly enough, survived the change-over to a one-party state.8s
Among Commonwealth African states, only in Malawi has a bill of
rights actually been abandoned.32 Nevertheless, as an effective protector of human rights the justiciable bill of rights does not have a
particularly impressive record in Africa. There is not the time to
particularize this assertion in much detail, but I would in this connection refer to the view expressed at an international conference
on human rights held at the University of Cape Town last year by
an expert on the subject, Professor James S. Read, of the University of London. He stated:
Thus in these early years of independence in black Africa the
legal protection of human rights has not flourished; perhaps it is
surprising that it has been attempted at all, and persisted in,
when the fragility of constitutions generally has been demonstrated by military coups and civil war; when the economic
problems faced by governments have been well-nigh insurmountable and accentuated for many of them by natural calamities like
drought and famine."
It is especially in regard to primary, as opposed to subsidary,
[27.
[28.
OF THE

See YEARBOOK OF The European CoNVaTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1970). (ed. note)]
The Constitution of Nigeria, reprinted in A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ CONSTIUTIrONS
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, XI (1980) [hereinafter cited as BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ]. The

1960 Constitution contained elaborate provisions guaranteeing to every Nigerian certain
basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. (ed. note)]
[29. The Constitution of Zimbabwe, Ch. 3, reprinted in BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ, (Supp.
1980), supra note 28. (ed. note)]
[30. In regard to the 1961 constitution, see J. COLE & W. DENISON, TANGANYIKA: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION (1964);
tion of Tanganyika, 13 INT. COMP. L.Q. (1964).

McAuslan, The Republican Constitu-

For the post-1965 structure, see McAuslan & Ghai, Constitutional Proposal for a OneParty State in Tanzania, 1 E. AFRICAN L.J. 124 (1965); A. Jacomy-Millette, The

Ombudsman in Africa,

LEGAL PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL,

AFRICAN SOURCE MATERIALS

(Center for African Legal Development, Faculty of Law, Haile Selassie I University, Addis
Ababa, 1971). (ed. note)]
[31. The Constitution of Zambia Part III, §§ 13-31, reprinted in BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ
(Supp. 1980) supra note 28; Constitution of Sierra Leone, ch. II, §§ 5-20, reprinted in

& FLANZ XIII, supra note 28. (ed. note)]
See J. PIKE, MALAWI: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
POLITICS OF PARTNERSHIP (1963). (ed. note)]
BLAUSTEIN

[32.
33.

HISTORY

(1968); P.

Human Rights: The Cape Town Conference 172 (Juts 1979).

KENTLEY, THE
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legislation that, according to Professor Read, the courts of Commonwealth African states have shown an unwillingness to hold
that the legislation in question was contrary to the Constitution."
The case of Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone" is, nevertheless, an instance of a contrary trend. In that case the appellant,
Akar, had lived in Sierra Leone for 56 years prior to that territory
being granted independence in 1961. He was the son of a Lebanese
father and an indigenous mother. In accordance with the new Constitution of Sierra Leone, he acquired citizenship of the new state
on independence." About a year later, legislation was passed, with
retrospective effect, purporting to amend the Constitution so as to
limit citizenship to persons of negro African descent, which was
defined to mean a person whose father and father's father were
negroes of African origin. 7 This excluded the appellant. The
amending legislation was not passed in the manner required for an
appropriate amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution contained a bill of rights protecting fundamental rights and freedoms,
34. Id. at 164.
35. [19691 3 All E.R. 384 (P.C.).
[36. Section 1(1) of the new Constitution of Sierra Leone provided:
Every person who, having been born in the former Colony or Protectorate of
Sierra Leone, was on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1961, a citizen of the United
Kingdom and Colonies or a British protected person shall become a citizen of
Sierra Leone on the twenty-seventh day of April, 1961:
Provided that a person shall not become a citizen of Sierra Leone by virtue of
this subsection if neither of his parents nor any of his grandparents was born in
the former Colony or Protectorate of Sierra Leone. (ed. note)]
[37. Section 2 of Act No. 12 of 1962, Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1962, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Amendment of Certain Sections of the Constitution,"
provides:
2. Section 1 of the Constitution is hereby amended(a) by the insertion immediately after the words "Every person" in the first line
of subsection (1) thereof of the words "of negro African descent"; and
(b) by the addition at the end thereof of the following new subsections"(3) For the purpose of this Constitution the expression 'person of negro African descent' means a person whose father and his father's father are or were negroes of African origin.
(4) Any person, either of whose parents is a negro of African descent and
would, but for the provisions of subsection (3), have been a Sierra Leone citizen,
may, on making appliction in such manner as may be prescribed, be registered as
a citizen of Sierra Leone, but such person shall not be qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives or of any District Council or other local authority unless he shall have resided continuously in Sierra Leone for twenty-five
years after such registration or shall have served in the Civil or regular Armed
Services of Sierra Leone for a continuous period of twenty-five years."
The provisions of the Act would deprive appellant of the citizenship granted him by the new
Constitution which came into operation immediately before April 27, 1961. (ed. note)]
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including the freedom from discrimination on the grounds of
race. 8 A proviso stated in effect that this did not apply to any law
in so far as it made provision for discrimination which was, "having regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining
. . .[to the persons affected] . . .reasonably justifiable in a demo-

cratic society." 9
Akar approached the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone for a declaration that the amendment was ultra vires the Constitution and
void. His claim was heard by the Chief Justice and succeeded. This
decision was reversed by the Sierra Leone Court of Appeal. 40 A
further appeal to the Privy Council in England was, however, successful (by a majority of 4 to 1, Lord Guest dissenting), and in
substance the decision of the Chief Justice was restored.' The majority of the Privy Council held that the amendment was clearly a
discrimination on grounds of race; that it was doubtful whether it
was one which was "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society";
but that, in any event, no special circumstances justifying the law
existed.' But in the end, the Government of Sierra Leone had the
last word. It had, in the meanwhile, amended the constitutional
protection retrospectively to permit such discrimination in citizenship laws.'
In many ways the difficulties encountered in Black African
states are understandable. Professor Abraham has stated that:
Experience has demonstrated that those countries that have exhibited stable or moderately stable traditions of judicial review
[38. Chapter II, § 11 of the Constitution sets forth a bill of rights. Section 17 of the
Constitution provides protection from discrimination on the grounds of race. Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone, [1969] 3 All E.R. 384, 387-88 (P.C.). (ed. note)]
[39. Appellee argued that the exception set forth in subsection (4)(f) of Section 23 of the
Constitution applied to this case. The excepting subsection provides:
(4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any law so far as that law
makes provision(f) whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned in subsection (3) of
this section may be subjected to any disability or restriction or may be accorded
any privilege or advantage which, having regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those persons or to persons of any other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
3 All E.R. 384, 388 (P.C.). (ed. note)]
[40. The order of the Court of Appeal of Sierra Leona was dated April 5, 1968. Id. at
385. (ed. note)]
[41. Id. (ed. note)]
[42. Id. (ed. note)]
[43. See Constitution of Sierra Leone, Ch. II, § 17, reprinted in BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ,
XIII, supra note 28. (ed. note)]
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are generally characterized by: (1) regime stability; (2) a competitive political party system; (3) significant horizontal power distributi6n; (4) a strong tradition of judicial independence; and (5) a
high degree of political freedom."
Post-independence Africa has been plagued, as Professor Read
says, by regime instability, and the rule of the emergent African
states has been characterized by suppression of opposition political
parties and the curtailment of political freedom. Generally, it has
not been favourable climate for the establishment of a strong tradition of judicial independence.
It must readily be conceded that South Africa's own record is
not an encouraging one. While the independence of the South African judiciary is, I think, above reproach, and while South African
judges over the years have not hesitated to strike down executive
or administrative acts found to be unlawful and subordinate legislation found to be unauthorized, parliamentary legislation has in
general remained sacrosanct.' 5 This is mainly due to the fact that
South African constitutions, with one exception (the pre-Union
constitution of the Orange Free State), have not contained a bill of
rights and have not conferred on the courts plenary powers to review the validity of acts of parliament. Nevertheless, in two famous
instances, Brown v. Leyds NO,"6 decided by the Supreme Court of
the Transvaal Republic in 1897, and Harris and Others v. The
Minister of the Interior and Another 47 (popularly known as "The
Coloured Vote Case"), decided by the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South Africa in 1952, the courts did declare laws
paksed by parliament to be invalid on the ground that they had
not been properly and constitutionally enacted. 4'8 But in each case
44. H. J. ABRAHAM,

THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS 279-80 (3d ed. 1975).

[45. See generally Hahlo & Maisels, The Rule of Law in South Africa, 52 VA. L. REv. 1
(1966) (ed. note)]
46. 4 Off. Rep. 17, 14 C.L.J. 71 (1897).
47. 1952(2) SA428 (AD).
[48. In Brown v. Leyds NO, the Volksraad of the South African Republic attempted to
void a previous proclamation by a resolution. The Court held that the resolution had no
effect on the grounds that a law properly passed could not be repealed, altered or interpreted by a mere resolution introduced in form of a law. 14 C.L.J. 71, 94. (ed. note)]
In "The Coloured Vote Case," the South African Parliament passed a law disallowing
Coloureds, who were previously entitled to vote, to vote in the same constituency as a white
person. The law was declared invalid. In so doing, "The Court ... [is] exercising a duty
which it owes to persons whose rights are entrenched by Statute; its duty is simply to declare and apply the law and it would be inaccurate to say that the Court in discharging, is
controlling the Legislature." 1952(2) SA428 (AD). (citing to Bryces' AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
456, 582 Vol. I (3d ed.). The Court further held that the courts have the power to declare an
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the government of the day refused to accept either the court's decision or the concept of judicial review of parliamentary legislation.
A struggle for constitutional supremacy ensued; in the end, parliament and the executive triumphed. In each case, though in different ways, the decision of the court involved was eventually
stultified.
Despite all this and despite the fact that South Africa has hitherto been nurtured on the British concept of parliamentary
supremacy, conditions for the importation of a form of judicial review to buttress a bill of rights are not altogether unfavourable.
Until now, there has been in South Africa regime stability, a long
tradition of parliamentary government based on the Westminister
model, and a competitive political party system. There is also a
strong tradition of judicial independence. Pressures, both internal
and external, and their interaction with doctrinaire policy-making,
have in recent years resulted in political freedom being to some
extent curtailed, but, it is hoped, a comprehensive settlement
would eliminate most, if not all, of these pressures. The potential
for tribal rivalry and friction, a major problem in Black Africa, undoubtedly exists, but urbanization and a cultural development
which has proceeded further in South Africa than in the former
colonies of Africa would tend to counter this. South Africa is economically prosperous and stable.
Unquestionably South Africans, whatever their views, will
watch with anxious interest developments in Zimbabwe. The
Zimbabwean Constitution of 1980 contains a comprehensive bill of
rights, called "the Declaration of Rights" (apparently based on the
European Convention on Human Rights), and also machinery for
its enforcement." The provisions for judicial review contain elements of both the American and West German systems. The relevant section, section 24, constitutes the Appellate Division of the
High Court of Zimbabwe as a special tribunal for the enforcement
of the Declaration of Rights. The court may be approached in two
ways. Firstly, any person alleging that the Declaration is being, or
is likely to be, contravened in relation to himself may apply to the
Appellate Division for redress. Secondly, if in any proceedings in

Act invalid upon the ground that it was not passed in conformity with the law. Id. (ed.
note)]
[49. THE CONSTITUTION OF ZIMmABWE, ch. 3, §§ 11-26 (bill of rights); ch. 3, § 24 (enforcement section), reprintedin BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ (Supp. 1980), supra note 28. See YEARBOOK
OF TH EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1970). (ed. note)]
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the General Division of the High Court or any other subordinate
court any question arises as to the contravention of the Declaration, the question may be referred to the Appellate Division for
determination. It is clear from section 24 that the constitutional
jurisdiction of the Appellate Division includes the power to declare
laws to be in contravention of the Declaration. It would seem, too,
that any other Court may in any proceedings hold a law to be in
contravention of the Declaration. This finding is subject to the
usual right of appeal.
The Declaration of Rights proclaims in resounding terms the
rights of the individual to life, to personal liberty, to protection
from slavery and forced labour, to protection from torture and inhuman or degrading punishment, to protection from deprivation of
property, to freedom from arbitrary search or entry upon his premises, to the protection of the law, to freedom of conscience and expression, to freedom of assembly, association and movement, and
to protection from discrimination on grounds of race, colour, political opinions or creed.50 Many of these freedoms, however, are
hedged in with qualifications. Thus, for example, the section 5 providing for freedom of assembly and association contains a savings
provision, to the effect that nothing contained in or done under
any law shall be held to be in contravention of the section, to the
extent that the law or action, inter alia, is in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health,
except so far as the provision or action is shown "not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society" (by now a familiar phrase).
This formula recurs with regard to many of the protected freedoms, and puts the onus ultimately on the court to decide what is
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. A general provision"'
permits derogations from the Declaration in a period of public
emergency.
This general formulation is an intriguing one, and constitutional
lawyers and others in South Africa will be interested to see
whether judicial review is permitted to become a significant force
for the preservation of human rights and individual freedoms in
Zimbabwe, and whether it effectively protects the position of minorities in that country. If it does, then it may well serve as an

[50.
(Supp.
51.
52.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe, ch. 3, §§ 12-23, reprinted in BLAUSTEIN & FLANZ
1980), supra note 28. (ed. note)]
Zimbabwe Constitution Order (SI 1979/1600), section 21.
Id., section 25.
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inspiration and guide for future constitutional development in
South Africa.
In discussing all these constitutional safeguards, one is ever conscious of the sentiment so well expressed by Justice Learned Hand:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes;
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men
and women; and when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no
court can save it.58
Nevertheless, constitutions, laws, and courts do provide a framework for the preservation of liberty and the protection of minority
rights." A constitutionally-entrenched bill of rights gives substance
to the framework, sets a standard which must inevitably have its
impact on politicians, bureaucrats, legislators and others, and
places upon those who wish to violate unlawfully the freedom of
others the onus of acting unconstitutionally. The power of judicial
review, properly exercised, can strike down unconstitutional action
and, even though the court is possessed of neither the purse nor
the sword, it is not easy for those affected by its decrees to ignore
them. In the course of time, the court may gain the confidence of
the community and the power of legitimacy. Liberty is thus encouraged to lie in the hearts of men and women.
So it is possible that sometime in the future there may be transported across the ocean that divides your country and mine something of great value, namely a workable and working system of judicial review; a fragile institution, no doubt, particularly vulnerable
to the buffets of authoritarianism and instability, but an institution which could, in favourable circumstances, do much to ease the
problems of Southern Africa.

LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LmBERTY 189-90 (1963).
[54. See also Corbett, Human Rights: The Road Ahead, 96 S.
(ed. note)]
53.

AFRICAN

L.J. 192 (1979).

